Illusion of Conflict: Real calculations of Tehran and Tel Aviv

Neither Tehran nor Tel Aviv will engage in a prolonged and direct war-a scenario that appears to be nothing more than a mere political sorcery. A closer examination of the rhetoric from both sides reveals that each party understands the other’s capabilities.

Following the April operation, dubbed “The Sincere Promise”, Israel became fully aware that the limits of Iranian power are less formidable than Tehran often projects. Meanwhile, Tehran seems to have realised that its rhetoric of “erasing Israel” is nothing more than a slogan intended for naive audiences.

Rather than engaging in direct conflict, both nations are likely to continue waging their battles through proxies and in territories beyond their own. This limited war will not have a strategic impact on altering the rules of the game, but it will inflict a devastating toll on the Arabs and their countries, who will bear the brunt of the violence.

Many in the Arab media have delved into the details surrounding Hamas chief Ismail Haniyeh’s assassination in Tehran, with some narratives veering into the realm of myth. In doing so, they have often overlooked the deeper analysis of intentions, particularly the reality that Israel is not necessarily a “permanent enemy of Iran”.

In fact, Israel’s hostility toward Tehran is largely confined to its support for the groups labelled as “Iran’s proxies” which pose varying degrees of nuisance to the Jewish state and international trade.

Ensnared by its own rhetoric

The Iranian regime oscillates between the “requirements of the state” and the “necessities of the revolution,” a balancing act that is far from simple.

Over time, interests have been entrenched, forces have grown, and institutions have formed to represent both sides within the current Iranian system. Publicly, both factions present themselves as “supporters of the republic,” but behind the scenes, they follow conflicting agendas, neither possessing the means to eliminate the other.

Complicating this already difficult dichotomy is a third party in Iran, one that exists outside the traditional hardliner-reformist equation. This group includes both organised opposition — both internal and external — and a larger, unorganised segment of the population.

Representing various ethnic and regional backgrounds, this segment is the majority and seeks a modern civil state focused on development, quality education and harmony with the international community.

The “necessities of the revolution” group has developed entrenched interests that are difficult to overcome, prompting the regime to make strenuous efforts to emotionally mobilise and appease this group, especially during moments it deems critical, such as the recent assassination of Haniyeh in Tehran.

To placate this faction, the regime issues hardline statements. Indeed, the regime has become ensnared by its own rhetoric — a common occurrence in totalitarian states.

In the wake of Haniyeh’s assassination, Iran initiated “consultations” on how to respond, engaging with militias, including the Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and various armed groups in Iraq.

This collaboration highlights a peculiar political phenomenon — an alliance between a state recognised by the United Nations, with ambassadors in most countries and a central government expected to adhere to international law, and militias that are internationally classified as terrorists.

Selling illusions

These groups, with their negative connotations and disregard for international norms, are also contested within their own countries. Yet, despite these contradictions, Iran continues to align with these non-state actors, raising questions about the nature and implications of such an alliance.

Hezbollah is not Lebanon, the Houthis are not Yemen, and the armed groups are not Iraq. These countries all have governments — some relatively effective, others mere facades — but governments, nonetheless, recognised by the international community.

Yet, militias operate outside these official structures, often disrupting them. The ongoing collaboration between these militias and Tehran underscores Iran’s intent to leverage these groups rather than engage directly in conflicts, reflecting a long-standing strategy.

Tehran orchestrated the “Al-Aqsa Flood” under the illusion of a “unity of squares”, a notion that some naive people believed. However, after the devastating clashes and widespread killing in Gaza, Iran remained largely a bystander, apart from a few rockets launched from southern Lebanon. Concurrently, Tehran engaged in political posturing.

As always, it is the Arab peoples who bear the brunt of the bloodshed, as seen in Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, and Iraq, while the Iranian people continue to suffer from the immense drain on material and human resources. This ongoing strategy has only deepened dissatisfaction within Iran, expanding the grounds for opposition.

The result is a persistent deprivation of the Iranian people’s right to a decent life, economic development, political stability and peaceful coexistence with their neighbours and the entire world.

As long as we remain mired in the practice of selling illusions to our people, stability will elude our region.

Mohammad Alrumaihi is an author and Professor of Political Sociology at Kuwait University